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Juvenile Delinquency in the Twenty-First
Century: Is Blended Sentencing the
Middle-Road Solution for Violent Kids?
INTRODUCTION

One need only watch the evening news or read the newspaper to realize

that in the last few years, highly publicized juvenile crimes have become
regular occurrences.' Every few months, there is another story about a
distraught high school,' or even grade-school' student, who has chosen to take
out his frustrations on his fellow classmates and teachers. 4 In the wake of the
Columbine High School shootings in April of 1999,1 both the United States
Congress and state legislatures clamored that laws combating juvenile crime

1. See, e.g., Scott Gold et al., Santee School Shootings: 2 Killed, 13 Hurt in School
Shooting, L.A. TIMES, Mar 6, 2001, at Al (breaking the news of the fifteen-year-old high
school student who terrorized his suburban San Diego high school); Robert L. Kaiser and V.
Dion Haynes, TeenagerOpens Firein Oregon HighSchool, PoliceFindParentsDeadatBoy's
HomeAfter Spree,Cla. TRm., May 22, 1998, § 1, at I (relating the story of a teenager who fired
indiscriminately into the cafeteria of his high school after killing his parents, killing one student
and wounding many).
2. See, e.g., Ben Fox, Teen Was Targeting Vice Principalin Rampage, CopsSay, CI.
TRI., Mar. 24, 2001, § 1, at 6 (reporting that an eighteen-year-old boy who shot five people at
his San Diego area school targeted the vice-principal when he arrived at school with a 12-gauge
shotgun in his hand and a .22-caliber handgun in his waistband); SanteeSchool Shootings,Past
School Shootings, L.A. TIMES. Mar. 6,2001, at A17 (listing a series of highly publicized school
shootings and juvenile crimes that occurred in California and across the nation).
3. See, e.g., Mike Clary, Teen's Life Sentence Sparks Juvenile Punishment Debate,
Cm. TRIB., Mar. 21, 2001, § 1, at I I (covering the story of Lionel Tate, the twelve-year-old
Florida boy who killed a six-year-old girl by imitating a professional wrestling move, and was
sentenced to life in prison after being found guilty of felony murder with an underlying charge
of aggravated child abuse).
4. See, e.g., Andrea Jones and R. Robin McDonald, School OfficialsAsking: When
is a Prank a Crime?, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Sept. 24,1999, at C9 (covering the story of a teacher
who died at the hands of a student in a Georgia alternative school); Craig Schneider, It
Happened Here: Every School's Dread Erupts Into Reality in Shooting at Heritage High,
ATLANTA J.-CONST., May 21, 1999, at Al (reporting the story of T.J. Solomon, the fifteen-yearold who unleashed a barrage of bullets into a crowd of students waiting for school to start at
Heritage High School, exactly one month after the Columbine shootings).
5. See 16 Hurt in ColoradoSchool After Gunmen Open Fire, CI. SUN-TIMES, Apr.
20, 1999, § 1 at 3; Robin McDowell, School Death Toll at 15, Cops Sweep for Bombs, Clm.
SUN-TIMES, Apr.21, 1999, § 1 at 3 (reporting the initial story of the Columbine shooting that
took the nation by storm).
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must be strengthened in order to protect society from young criminals.6
Illinois was no different. Less than a year earlier, the Illinois General
Assembly approved a completely revised version of the Juvenile Court Act,
in an attempt to deal effectively with increasingly violent juvenile crime, and
crimes involving firearms around schools were statutorily excluded from the
juvenile court within a few months of the Columbine shootings.7
As a result of the attention focused on specific incidents.ofjuvenile crime
recently, jurisdictions across the country have been forced to reexamine their
stance on this important and controversial topic, and various solutions have
been proposed.' This article will discuss the history of the juvenile justice
system in America, from its English common law origin, through the
Progressive Era of the late nineteenth century, to the 1998 revisions in Illinois.
In Parts I and IV, the article will focus on current problems with the juvenile
system in Illinois, highlighted in the context of a recent Illinois Supreme Court
decision, In re G.O. 9 , a case in which a thirteen-year-old boy was adjudicated
delinquent for first degree murder and sentenced to the Department of
Corrections, without parole, until age twenty-one." In Part IV, it will point
out the pendulum-like historical nature of juvenile law and argue that a
balance must be struck between the purely punitive approach of common law
England, and the optimistically nurturing approach that created the juvenile
justice system in Illinois over one-hundred years ago. This article will
specifically address the question of whether it is time to remove the general
ban on jury trials, as a matter of right, for juveniles charged with serious
crimes." In Parts U1 and IV, the merits of extended jurisdiction juvenile
prosecution ("EJJP"), one of the most significant recent changes to the
Juvenile Court Act, will be explained, and it will be argued that EJJPcan, and

6. See H.R. Con. Res. 90, 106th Cong. (1999) (explaining that Congress mourns the
loss of life at Columbine High School and that it resolves to redouble the effort to prevent
juvenile crime and combat school violence); 705 ILL CoM. STAT. ANN. 405/5-130(a) (West

Supp. 2000) (adding aggravated battery with a firearm committed in or around a school to the
list of automatic transfer provisions); see also Lisa Black, New Laws Target School Violence:
Ryan Signs Bills to IncreaseSecurity, Ci. TRIB., June 5, 1999, § 1, at 6.
7. See 705 ILL COMP. STAT. 405/5-101-820 (1998); Black, supra note 6; infra notes

73-74 and accompanying text.
the

8. For a frequently updated, comparative analysis of juvenile code provisions for all

states,

see National

Center

for Juvenile

Justice

Statistics,

at

http://www.ncjj.org/stateprofiles/index.html (Jan. 5,2001); see alsoPATRICIATORBET& LINDA
SZYMANSKI, STATE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME:

1996-97 UPDATE 4-

9(1998) (analyzing waiver provisions adopted by each of the states and trends in juvenile law).
9. 727 N.E.2d 1003 (Il. 2000).
10. Id. at 1005.

11.

See infra Part IV.
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should be utilized in nearly every violent and/or habitual juvenile situation.'
It will be asserted that EJJP is indeed the middle-road solution that best serves
both the rehabilitative needs of the juvenile, which the child savers were
concerned about in the late nineteenth century, and the punitive reality of
twenty-first century life. Furthermore, in Part IV this article will argue that the
scenario of In re G. 0. illustrates exactly the type of situation in which EJJP
is most beneficial, and that it should have been utilized in In re G. 0., had the

new provision been in force when 0.O. was charged.

I. HISTORY OF JUVENILES IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM
A. COMMON LAW SYSTEM

The history of the discipline of juveniles is long and varied, but the
emphasis was traditionally on the punishment of misbehaved children." As
far back as recorded laws extend, there has been attention focused on the
discipline of juveniles. 4 The Hammurabic Code, from 2270 B.C., provided
that "[i]f a son strike his father, one shall cut off his hands," emphasizing the
biblical concept of an "eye for an eye" with respect to juvenile misbehavior
and crime in general.' 5 In fact, the nature of pre-industrial society was
generally, that children deserve no special treatment. If children committed
crimes, knowing what they did was wrong, they were held accountable to the
same extent as adults.' By examining the harsh manner in which the common
law dealt with juvenile offenders, it is possible to understand the long history
Jane Addams was reacting to as she strove to create a juvenile system that
recognized the need to nurture and rehabilitate children, rather than simply
punish them.' 7
In the Middle Ages in England, the Christian church exercised wide
influence with respect to justice. Usually, punishment for crimes was the
same for children as for adults."8 For example, one early seventeenth century
writer observed that an infant eight years of age who committed homicide
could be hanged if he could differentiate between good and evil, and had

12.

13.

See infra text accompanying notes 164-68.

See infra note 20 and accompanying text.

14. CUFMRD E. SIMONSEN, JUVENl JUSTICE INAMERICA 5 (3d ed. 1991). Simonsen
explains that the Hammurabic Code, which dates from 2270 B.C., was the first attempt to codify
laws governing such things as business transactions, property rights, rights of master and slave,
and family relationships.
15. Id.
16. See infra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
18. SIMONSEN, supra note 14, at 8.
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knowledge of the "perill and danger of that offense."' 9 However, before the
generally accepted age of discretion (fourteen) some authorities held that
execution should not be carried out since the goal of punishment would not be
properly effected.' A child cannot be deterred by fear of punishment if he
cannot comprehend what is wrong or improper.
From the late seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, the distinctions
among children became firmly established. Sir Matthew Hale wrote that, with
respect to crimes and punishments, there were four ranks between birth and
full capacity. 2 At fourteen, a person was considered pubertas,and suffered
the full consequences of their actions, since they were assumed doli capaces,
capable of discerning good from evil.22 While it was clear that under seven,
a person was presumed incapacesdoli and incapable of being found guilty of
a felony, the period between seven and fourteen was less certain.2 3 A child
between twelve and fourteen was not primafacie presumed to be doli capax,
and often children under fourteen were found not guilty of capital offenses.2
It was the duty of the court and jury, therefore, to decide if the accused child
under fourteen was capable of discerning between good and evil, in order to
overcome the presumption to the contrary. If so, he could, in fact be convicted
and undergo the punishment of death.25
Similarly, William Blackstone wrote that the law of England privileged
minors with respect to common misdemeanors, but at fourteen, he or she had

19. MICHAEL DALTON, THE COUNTREY JUSTICE, CONTEYNING THE PRACTICE OF THE
JUSTICES OFTHE PEACE OUT OFTHEIR SESSIONS (1618), reprintedin JUVENILE OFFENDERS FOR
A THOUSAND YEARS 11 (Wiley B. Sanders ed., 1970).
20. See, e.g., SIR EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OFTHE INSTITUTES OFTHE LAWS OF
ENGLAND: CONCERNING HIGH TREASON, AND OTHER PLEAS OF THE CROWN, AND CRIMINAL

CAUSES 4 (London, W. Rawlins, 6th ed. 1680). The goal of punishment generally was that
others may "fear to offend," and Coke observed that punishment can be no example to infants
who are not of the age of discretion since they cannot discern what is right. Id.
21. SIR MATrHEW HALE, HIsTORIAPLACITORUM CORONAE: THE HISTORY OFTHEPLEAS
OFTHE CROWN 17 (Robert H. Small ed., Philadelphia 1847) (1680). The full age of consent for
contractual obligations was 21 years, while the four stages of infancy were as follows: Infantia
(under 7), Aetas pubertatiproxima (7-11, the middle distance between infancy and puberty),
Aetas pubertatis(14-17, middle puberty) Pubertatisplena (18-20, puberty complete). Hale, as
well as Blackstone, considered non-age a defect of will similar to lunacy or idiocy with respect
to culpability. Id.
22. Id. at 18.
23. Id. at 19. Hale noted that at eleven a child is more easily presumed to be doli capax,
and therefore may suffer as another man, unless "by great circumstances" it appears that he is
incapax doli.
24. Id. at 26.

25. Id.
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to answer for their transgressions.2 6 They could no longer be supposed
innocent of any capital crime.27 The focus, however, was less on age and
more on understanding. If the child was under fourteen, though it appeared
to the court and jury that he could discern between good and evil, he could
have been convicted and made to suffer death.' In reality, however, a
sentence of death did not necessarily ensure that it would be carried out.29
B. THE REHABIUTATIVE MOVEMENT AND THE FIRST JUVENILE COURT

In contrast to the harsh treatment of juvenile offenders at common law,
the modem era of juvenile justice in America was based on a perceived need
to help, rather than punish wayward children. The modem American juvenile
system began in Chicago in the late nineteenth century, led by Jane Addams
and a group of reformers known as the child savers. 0 She espoused the
"recapitulation theory," which held that through proper guidance and
influence, social reformers could transform evil youths into "angels of
virtue."'" Addams helped found the Hull House to help poor immigrant
children in Chicago in the late 1880s.32 She was determined to induce the
state to reverse the practice of neglecting children and throwing them in jail
with adults when they committed crimes.33 The juvenile justice system was
created with the laudable goal of saving, rehabilitating and protecting rather
34
than punishing, incarcerating and penalizing our troubled children.
26.

WILiAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARiEs ON THE LAWS oFENGLAND 592-93

(William

Hardcastle Browne ed., West Publishing Co. 1897) (1760).
27. Id. at 593.
28. Id. Blackstone gives an example of a thirteen-year-old girl who was burned for
killing her mistress and a ten-year-old boy who was hung after being judged doli capax due to
the fact that he hid the body he killed, thereby showing his "consciousness of guilt." Id.
29. See SIMONSEN, supra note 14, at 8, 12. A sentence of death could be pardoned by
the judge or commuted. These events often went unrecorded. For example, before the American
Revolution, a popular alternative to execution was transportation to America (Australia
remained a transportation destination until 1875, however).
30. Id. at 27.
31. Id.
32. See generally BARBARA G.POLUKOFF, WITH ONE BOLD ACT: THE STORY OF JANE
ADDAMS (1999).(discussing Addams' biography, the history of the Hull House, and the events
that led to the passage of the Juvenile Court Act).
33. Aaron Chambers, Innocence Lost, Cm. DAILY L. BUIt-, Dec. 16, 1999, at 65; see
infra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
34. See Claudia Worrell, PretrialDetention of Juveniles: Denial of Equal Protection
Masked by the ParensPatriaeDoctrine,95 YALE L.J. 174, 176 (1985). It should be noted that
the definition of juvenile is specific: a person subject to juvenile court proceedings because a
statutorily defined event was alleged to have occurred while the offender's age was below the
statutorily defined limit, twenty-one in Illinois. A delinquent juvenile, or minor, is any one who
prior to his or her seventeenth birthday has violated or attempted to violate any federal, state,
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The first juvenile court was established in Illinois in 1899, as a result of

the efforts of the child savers." It was based on the doctrine of parens
6
patriae,that the state has an obligation to assist in the rearing of children.
It provided that all children under sixteen charged with violating any state or
local law would face adjudication in a court separate from the adult criminal
court.37 Because the hearings did not result in criminal convictions, the child
did not receive the full array of procedural protections and constitutional
rights afforded to similarly situated adults.3 However, after more than fifty
years of the juvenile system in practice, the United States Supreme Court
began to recognize that procedural guarantees were constitutionally necessary
for juveniles as well as adults.
C. THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE JUVENILE COURT

In Kent v. United States, the first Supreme Court case to require certain
procedural protections in juvenile court proceedings, a sixteen-year-old
defendant was arrested and charged with raping a woman. 9 Without holding
a hearing, obtaining records, or reciting reasons for his decision, the juvenile
court judge waived jurisdiction and transferred the case to the United States

county or municipal law. See 705 ILL COMP. STAT. 405/5-105 (1998). For a list of the ages of
criminal responsibility for each state, see PATRICIATORBETETAL, JUVENnES FACNG CR2MNAL
SANCTIONS: THREE STATES THATCHANGEDTHERULES 9 (2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.
orglpdffilesl/ojjdp/181203.pdf Oast visited Mar. 18, 2001) [hereinafter THREE STATES].
Laws 131 (codified as
35. Illinois Juvenile Court Act, Ch. 23 §§ 169-89, 1899 Ill.
amended at 705 IlL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-101-820 (1998). The Act to regulate the treatment and
control of dependent, neglected, and delinquent children was approved by the Illinois General
Assembly April 21, 1899, and effective July 1, 1899. Within twelvi years, twenty-two states had
followed Illinois' example, and by 1925 all but two states had juvenile courts. Maine and
Wyoming finally created ajuvenile court system by 1945. See SIMONSEN, supra note 14, at 229.
36. Parens Patriae literally means "parent of the country." It refers to the traditional
role of the State as sovereign and guardian of persons under a legal disability to act for
themselves, such as juveniles, the insane, or the unknown. The doctrine originated in the ancient
duty of the English sovereign to protect all children within his or her kingdom. See generally
47 AM. JUR. 2D Juvenile Courts and Delinquent and Dependant Children § 35 (1995)
(explaining the doctrine of parens patriae within the context of juvenile court proceedings).
37. Illinois Juvenile Court Act, Ch. 23 § 171, 1899 fl1. Laws 131 (codified as amended
at 705 ILL COMP. STAT. 405/5-120 (1998)). The statute provided that "a special court room shall
be designated as the juvenile court room ...and the court may for convenience be called the
Juvenile Court." Id.
38. Prior to the late 1960s, juveniles were entitled to only the fundamental due process
right of fair treatment, and were denied such rights as bail, indictment by a grand jury, speedy
and public trials, trial by jury, immunity against self-incrimination, confrontation of adverse
witnesses, and in some cases, representation by counsel. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S.
541, 555 (1966); infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
39. Kent, 383 U.S. at 546.
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District Court for the District of Columbia.4 'Ajury subsequently found the
defendant guilty and he was sentenced to thirty to ninety years in
incarceration.'" On appeal, the defendant contended that juveniles were
entitled to the same constitutional guarantees as adults charged with the same
crimes.' 2 For the first time since the implementation of the juvenile court
system, the Supreme Court expressed concerns about its effectiveness, saying
that "the child receives the worst of both worlds ... he gets neither the
protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative
treatment postulated for children."' 3 The Court held that a child who is
potentially to be waived into criminal court by the juvenile court judge is
"entitled to a hearing, including access by his counsel to the social records and
probation or similar reports which presumably are considered by the court,
and to a statement of reasons for the juvenile court's decision.'" Moreover,
the Court stated that care and treatment of delinquent children, the original
purpose of the juvenile court system, was not being fulfilled as a result of a
lack of personnel and facilities. 5
A year after Kent, the Supreme Court decided In re Gault, where the
Court was asked to consider whetherjuvenile offenders should be afforded the
same due process rights as adults.' In its analysis, the Court cited the
traditional justifications for denying children constitutional protections: that
juvenile hearings were neither adversarial, nor criminal, and that the child was
to be rehabilitated by the State acting in its parens patriae" capacity."
However, despite the purpose of the juvenile system, the Court found that the
lack of procedural safeguards was, in reality, producing unconstitutionally
arbitrary and capricious rulings."9 To meet the essentials of due process and
fair treatment, the Court held that juveniles are entitled to written notice of the
charges against them, the right to counsel, the right to confront and crossexamine witnesses, and the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination." Many scholars have used Gault as an acknowledgment that
the juvenile justice system is no longer rehabilitative, but rather quasi-

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 556.
Id.
Id. at 557.

45. Kent, 383 U.S. at 556.
46. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
47. See supra note 36.
48. Gault, 387 U.S. at 14-17.
49. Id. at 18; see infra note 157 and accompanying text.
50. Id. at 31-57. A recent Illinois case that recognized the same rights for juveniles in
Illinois as those granted by Gault was In re W.C., 657 N.E.2d 908 (111. 1995).
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criminal, and should therefore be eliminated or substantially reformed to give
children more procedural protection.5'
The Supreme Court has extended Gault, by holding that juveniles must
be found delinquent beyond a reasonable doubt,5 2 and that the Double
Jeopardy Clause prevents the prosecution of a young person in criminal court
after he has been previously adjudicated in a juvenile court. 3 However,
despite being afforded these protections, the Court has held that juveniles are
not constitutionally entitled to a jury trial. The United States Supreme Court
in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,4 and the Illinois Supreme Court in In re Fucini,
has held that a jury trial is not constitutionally required, as a matter of
procedural due process, in ajuvenile court proceeding. 5 The McKeiver Court
indicated that the right to a jury trial would most disrupt the unique nature of
the juvenile process. 6 Although admitting that the rehabilitative ideal had
fallen short of its goals, the Court said that a declaration of delinquency is

significantly different from and less "onerous" than a finding of criminal
guilt.5" Concluding that the addition of a jury trial would not strengthen the
fact-finding function, but would instead damage the juvenile court's ability to

51. See, e.g., Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the
Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083 (1991);
Deborah L. Mills, Note, United States v. Johnson: Acknowledging the Shift in the Juvenile
Court System from Rehabilitationto Punishment,45 DEPAUL L. REV. 903 (1996) (arguing that
it is time to rethink the purposes served by the juvenile courts, in light of the increasingly
criminal nature of juvenile proceedings and that juvenile crimes are included in the United
States Sentencing Commission Guidelines for punishing recidivism) [hereinafterAcknowledging
the Shift]; infra Part IV.
52. In In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 359 (1970), the Court did away with the
preponderance of the evidence standard in juvenile proceedings, and held that proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is among the essentials of due process, and fair treatment "when a juvenile is
charged with an act which would constitute a crime if committed by an adult." In Illinois, the
case that said juveniles must be proved delinquent beyond a reasonable doubt is In re Urbasek,
232 N.E.2d 716 (Ill. 1967).
Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
53
54. 403 U.S. 528,91 S.Ct. 1976(1971).
55. In re Fucini, 255 N.E.2d 380, 382 (Ill. 1970). In this case, a child who was
adjudged delinquent for grand theft of an automobile challenged the constitutionality of the
whole Juvenile Court Act because it failed to provide for a jury trial. Id. at 380. The Court in
Fuciniheld that a jury trial would instill "all the clash and clamor of the adversary system that
necessarily goes with it," and would create in mind and memory of the child the same effect as
if it were. Id. at 382. The fact that the juvenile is given the option under the Juvenile Court Act
to be proceeded against criminally, the court said, should not work to defeat the beneficial
aspects of the act. Id.
56. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 540. Although the Supreme Court in Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) held that trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the
American scheme of justice, the McKeiver Court refused to see the essentially criminal nature
of juvenile courts.
57. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 540.
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function in a unique manner, the Court stated that it was not prepared to

abandon the rehabilitative goals and minimal advances of the system by
8
placing the juvenile "squarely in the hands of the criminal process."" Thus,

the Supreme Court accepted the argument that giving juveniles all the
procedural guarantees of the adult criminal trial was tantamount to eliminating
the need for a separate system.59 Most authorities agree, however, that the

biggest threat to the intended juvenile system comes, not froii granting

procedural rights at trial, but from the possibility of incarceration in prison
without the rehabilitative social and educational services' that juvenile

facilities were intended to provide." Consequently, despite decades of
criticism, neither the Illinois Supreme Court nor the United States Supreme
Court has ruled that juveniles do, in fact, have a right to be tried in front of a

jury.

62

II. THE MODERN TREND: TRANSFER PROVISIONS AND ALTERNATIVES
With the increasing prevalence of guns being used by children during the
past decade, and the proliferation of violent crimes committed by our nation's
youth,6 3 the general reaction by legislators and prosecutors has been to

58. Id. at 547.
59. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 546 n.6. The Court cited the task force report from the
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (1967), which had
not recommended that a jury trial right be extended to juveniles. Id.The Court concluded that
the ideal of separate treatment for juveniles was "still worth pursuing," so it was not going to
force the adversary system on the states by granting a jury trial right. Id.
60. See, e.g., Michelle India Baird& Mina B. Samuels, JusticeFor Youth: The Betrayal
of Childhood in the United States, 5 J.L & PoL'Y 177, 197-98 (1996) (arguing that prison-like
conditions in secure juvenile facilities do not allow for educational or mental and emotional
counseling programs as intended); THREE STATES, supra note 34, at 11 (reporting that the
under-eighteen prison population nationwide grew 22% between 1991 and 1995).
61. See Steven A. Drizin, Net of Automatic Transfer Growing Too Wide, CHI. DAILY
L. BULL, Apr. 21, 1999, at 4 (arguing that since the 1999 high school shootings that resulted
in more transfers to criminal court, increasing numbers of kids are being exposed to dangerous
conditions of confinement with adults; precisely what Jane Addams feared when she advocated
a separate system for juveniles) [hereinafter Automatic Transfer]. See generally CLEMENS
BARTOLLAS ETAL, JUVENILE VICIMZATION: THE INSTrrUTIONALPARADOX (1976) (arguing that
juvenile institutions are failing at rehabilitation for the same reason that children should not be
incarcerated with adults: older kids abuse and molest younger kids).
62. See infra notes 157-166 and accompanying text.
63. See, e.g., HOWARD N. SNYDER & MEUSSA SICKMUND, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND
VICTIMS: 1999 NATIONALREPORT 53- 54 (1999) (reporting that the number of murder offenders
in each age group between fourteen and seventeen increased substantially from 1984 through
1993, and that all of the increase in homicides by juveniles between the mid-1980s and mid1990s was firearm related). But see id. at 62 (reporting that serious violence, like sexual
assaults, aggravated batteries and assaults by juveniles dropped 33% between 1993 and 1997).
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increase the number of kids who are transferred to adult criminal court.' As
a result, the jurisdiction of the juvenile court has been shrinking,6' while the
danger of incarceration in adult facilities has become very real.66 This fact,
however, does not negate the need for ensuring procedural protection for those
children who do, in fact, commit dangerous crimes, but either because of age
or a decision by the prosecutor not to bring adult charges, remain in the
juvenile court system.
A. THE HISTORY OF TRANSFER PROVISIONS

The history of transfer provisions can be divided into roughly three
periods.6 The first period, from 1899 to 1966, involved an uncertainty about
the extent of the juvenile court's jurisdiction in relation to that of the criminal
court.6" Transfer to criminal court during this period only occurred with older,
repeat, violent offenders, and transfer was at the discretion of prosecutors or
judges.69 Following Kent in 1966, the second period of transfer began, and
judges had sole discretion to transfer children into criminal court during this

64. See BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OFTHE JUVENILE
COuRT 208 (1999) [hereinafter BAD KIDS]. Professor Feld maintains that politicians have
exploited the fears of the public and demonized wayward children in order to gain support for
policies under which youths can be transferred to criminal court and incarcerated. Id.
65. Id
66. Id. at 240. As a result of changes in waiver laws, excluding certain offenses from
the juvenile court, criminal courts sentence increasing numbers of kids to adult correctional
facilities. Professor Feld reports that offenders younger than eighteen years of age accounted
for about 2% of new court commitments to prisons, according to a 1995 survey from the U.S.
General Accounting Office. Id. Although the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act,
42 U.S.C. § 5633 (1994), provides that states must not incarcerate juveniles in any institution
where they would have regular contact with adults, in order to obtain federal funding made
available under the act, it does not completely ban juvenile incarceration with adults. See JAMES
C. HOWELL, JUVENILE JUSTICE & YOUTH VIOLENCE 37-38 (1997) (reporting that states maintain
eligibility for federal grant funding under the act by making sufficient progress toward achieving
the act's goals, rather than actual fulfilment of those goals, and that a state's participation in the
IJDP Act Formula Grants Program is voluntary); BAD KIDS, supra note 64, at 176 (noting that
the JJDP statute allows states to continue receiving federal funds as long as there is "substantial
compliance with JJDP guidelines," or if the noncompliance was de minimis).
67. See Daniel E. Traver, Comment, The Wrong Answer to A Serious Problem:A Story
of School Shootings, Politics and Automatic Transfer, 31 LOY. U. CH. L.J. 281,285 (2000).
For a good overview of the history and trends in transfer provisions in the United States, see
Eric K. Klein, Note, Dennis the Menace or Billy the Kid: An Analysis of the Role of Transfer
to CriminalCourt in JuvenileJustice,35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 371 (1998) [hereinafter Dennis the
Menace].
68. Automatic Transfer,supra note 61, at 4.
69. Id.
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time." However, juvenile judges were perceived as too lenient by legislators,
so in 1982, the Illinois General Assembly passed its first automatic transfer
statute." The introduction of automatic transfer provisions represents the
third, modem, period in the history of transfer laws. These statutes were
designed to make it easier for the prosecutor to try as an adult a juvenile
charged with crimes such as first degree murder, or aggravated criminal sexual
assault. 2 Increasing numbers of states are enacting such statutes in an effort
to get tough on juvenile crime, and automatic transfer continues to be a
popular method for dealing with particularly violent juvenile offenders."
70. The Supreme Court in Kent, 383 U.S. at 566, listed the following factors for the
judge to weigh in deciding whether to transfer a child into criminal court: (1) the seriousness
of the alleged offense to the community (2) whether the offense was committed in an aggressive,
violent or willful manner (3) whether the alleged offense was against persons or property, where
greater weight is given to offenses committed against persons (4) the'prospective merit of the
complaint (5) the desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court when the
juvenile's associates in the alleged offense are adults (6) the maturity of the juvenile, determined
by the juvenile's home, emotional attitude and pattern of living (7) the record and previous
history of the juvenile (8) likelihood of rehabilitation of the juvenile. Id. These factors have
been adopted by Illinois and can be found in substantially similar form at 705 ILL COM. STAT.
ANN. 405/5-805(2)(b) (West Supp. 2000), except that in Illinois, the juvenile judge must give
"greater weight to the seriousness of the alleged offense and the minor's prior record of
delinquency than to the other factors." Id
71. See ILL REv. STAT. Ch. 37 1 702-7(6)(a) (West Supp. 1982) (codified as amended
at 705 ILL COUP. STAT ANN. 405/5-130 (West Supp. 2000). The statute provided that any minor
at least fifteen years of age, charged with "murder, rape, deviate sexual assault or armed robbery
when the armed robbery was committed with a firearm," would be excluded from the juvenile
court and tried in adult criminal court. Id.; see also Traver, supra note 67, at 290 (reporting that
critics of Kent cited rising juvenile crime and Juvenile Court leniency as evidence that a focus
on punishment was needed).
72. 705 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-130(l)(a) (West Supp. 2000). In 1999, the
General Assembly added the crime of aggravated battery with a firearm committed in a school
to the list of automatic transfer crimes with Senate Bill 759. See Automatic Transfer,supranote
61 (arguing that the addition of the school offense was unnecessary given that the prosecutor
can ask the judge to try juveniles charged with gun crimes as adults and they are presumed to
be unfit for juvenile court unless the defendant can prove otherwise under 705 ItL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 405/5-805(2)(a) (West Supp. 2000); Traver, supra note 67, at 315 (arguing that the
passage of the new aggravated battery with a firearm provision represents a politically motivated
and incorrect answer to dealing with school shootings).
73. See Jeffrey A. Butts & Ojmarrh Mitchell, Brick by Brick-Dismantling the Border
Between Juvenile and Adult Justice, 2 CRIM. J. 2000 167, 182 (2000), available at
http:l/www.ncjrs.org/criminal-justice2OOO/vol2/02f2.pdf (reporting that the popularity of
statutory exclusion laws increased significantly in the 1990s, and as of 1997, twenty-eight states
statutorily excluded at least some juveniles charged with certain offenses); HOWARD N. SNYDER
ETAL, JUVENLE TRANSFERS TO CRIMINALCOURT IN THE 1990'S: LESSONS LEARNED FROM FOUR

STUDIES 4-5 (2000) (reporting that between the 1992 and 1997 legislative sessions, forty-five

states expanded their statutory provisions governing the transfer ofjuveniles to criminal court,
and most did so by adding statutory exclusion provisions, lowering minimum ages, adding
eligible offenses, or making judicial waiver presumptive)."

NORTHERN IWLNOIS UNIVERS1Y LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21

Currently in Illinois, any juvenile at least fifteen-years-old, charged with one
of the specifically-listed crimes, is tried in adult criminal court, and expressly
excluded from juvenile court jurisdiction.74
B. EXTENDED JURISDICTION JUVENILE PROSECUTION

Today, in addition to automatic transfer, there are various methods in
place across the country for either transferring children to adult courts, or
treating them as adults for sentencing purposes.75 Illinois has adopted a
modem hybrid transfer provision called extended jurisdiction juvenile
prosecution ("EJJP"), one of the most significant additions to the Juvenile

Court Act that was passed by the legislature with the Juvenile Justice Reform

Provisions of 1998. This system provides that a juvenile, at least thirteenyears-old, charged with an offense that would be a felony if committed by an
adult, be tried in juvenile court, and given the full panoply of procedural
rights, including a jury trial." A "blended" sentence results, whereby the
juvenile receives both a juvenile sentence and a stayed adult sentence for the
crime, imposed by a juvenile court judge.7" The juvenile serves his or her
sentence in a juvenile facility, and if it is successfully completed, the adult
conviction is dropped. 9 However, if the juvenile convicted in an extended

74. 705 IL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-130(l)(a) (West Supp. 2000). The statute states
that any minor who at the time of the offense was at least fifteen years of age, and is charged
with first degree murder, aggravated criminal sexual assault, aggravated battery with a firearm
committed in, or around, a school, armed robbery with a firearm, or vehicular hijacking with a
firearm, shall be expressly tried under the criminal laws of Illinois, and excluded from Juvenile
Court. Id. Additionally, a minor charged with a drug offense in or around a school or a public
housing complex is statutorily excluded from the juvenile court. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
405/5-130(2)(a) (West Supp. 2000).
75. There are generally three ways in which ajuvenile could be transferred: (1) judicial
waiver, (2) statutory waiver or statutory exclusion, or (3) prosecutorial waiver. See Dennis the
Menace, supranote 67, at 384. Illinois has adopted all three methods. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT.
405/5-130,405/5-805 (1998). For an explanation of the methodologies behind different forms
of transfer provisions, see PATRICLA TORBET ET AL., STATE RESPONSES TO SERIous AND
VIOLENT JUVENILE CRBAE 25-34 (1996) [hereinafter STATE RESPONSES].
76. For an overview of the changes to the Juvenile Court Act in 1998, see Michele M.
Jochner, An Overview of the Juvenile Justice Reform Provisions of 1998, 87 ILL. B.J. 152
(1999).

77. 705 ILL COMP. STAT.405/5-810(3) (1998). The statute provides that a minor subject
to extended jurisdiction juvenile prosecution has the right to a jury trial and that the trial shall
be open to the public. Although EJJP conceivably applies to any felony, those offenses which
fall under the automatic transfer provision are not eligible for EJJP. See 705 ILL COMP. STAT.
405/5-130 (1998); see also Part IV infra for a discussion of the importance of a jury trial right
for juvenile proceedings.
78. 705 TL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-810(4).
79. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-810(7).
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jurisdiction juvenile prosecution violates his or her sentence, or commits a
new offense, the court can issue a warrant for the arrest of the juvenile and
revoke the stay of the criminal sentence, thereby forcing the juvenile to serve
his sentence as an adult. 80
EJJP has received acclamation by legal experts,"' and it is being adopted
by an increasing number of jurisdictions.8 2 Its beneficial effects on the
juvenile justice system are evident in its flexibility and in reduced recidivism
rates for juveniles.8 3 EJJPis a useful alternative to automatic transfer because
it furthers the goals of rehabilitation and accountability, as well as protection
of the public from juvenile crime. 4 Successful completion of the juvenile
sentence lowers recidivism rates, as compared to juveniles incarcerated with
80. 705 IW.Comp. STAT. 405/5-810(6). This section provides that a hearing is to be
held before executing the previously imposed adult criminal sentence, where ajudge determines
by a preponderance of the evidence, if a new offense or a violation of the juvenile sentence
occurred.

81. See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, The Transformationof the Juvenile Court Part 1l: Race
andthe "Crack Down" on Crime, 84 MINN. L. REV. 327,369 (2000) (explaining that EJJP and

other blended sentencing options represent an effort to effectively respond to both career
criminality that begins in adolescence and continues into adulthood, and other criminal
behavior, less advanced on the "developmental continuum") [hereinafter Crack Down];
Katheryn A. Santelmann & Kari L. Lillesand, Extended JurisdictionJuveniles in Minnesota:
A Prosecutor'sPerspective,25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1303, 1335 (1999) (arguing that EJJP
gives the court and prosecutors an option short of prison for juveniles who are amenable to
treatment within the juvenile system).
82. EJJP originated in Minnesota in the mid- 1990s and the current version can be found
at MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 260B.130 (West Supp. 2001). See Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and
Public Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile Justice Law Reform, 79 MINN. L. REV. 965, 1040-51

(1995) (discussing the development of EJJP in Minnesota)[hereinafter Violent Youth]; Mary E.

Spring, Comment, ExtendedJurisdictionJuvenileProsecution:A New Approach to the Problem
of Juvenile Delinquency in Illinois, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1351, 1364-67, 1384 (1998)

(explaining which jurisdictions had adopted EJJP as of 1998, and arguing that Illinois should
fully utilize EJJP in its struggle to eradicate youth crime) [hereinafter Extended Jurisdiction];
STATE RESPONSES, supranote 75, at 17-24 (stating that at least sixteen states have implemented
some form of blended sentencing, and analyzing the differences between each state's version).
83. See Extended Jurisdiction,supra note 82, at 1366-67 (reporting that EJJP reduces
recidivism among child offenders, and that the majority of children are successfully completing
their juvenile dispositions); Jennifer M. Balboni and James Alan Fox, Hard Truth: Serving
Adult Time Makes More Crime, B. GLOBE, July 2, 2000, at Fl (reporting that juveniles
incarcerated in adult prisons had substantially higher recidivism rates than juveniles who stayed
in the juvenile system); see also, David Goodman, Teen to be Sentenced Today, GRAND RAPIDS

PRESS, Jan. 13, 2000, at C12 (covering the controversy surrounding use of Michigan's new
blended sentencing law). Rev. Al Sharpton and Martin Luther King III opposed, while
prosecutors argued that experts agreed blended sentencing was the best way for violent juvenile
offenders to receive rehabilitative services. Id.
84. See Extended Jurisdiction,supranote 82, at 1375 (explaining that overlapping the
jurisdictions of the juvenile system and the criminal system keeps young and reformable
children away from the criminal courts, while providing older children one last chance at
rehabilitation).
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adults, mainly because there are specific educational and social services in
place at juvenile facilities, that are not available for incarcerated adults 85
Furthermore, the child appreciates the consequences of his conduct, since he
is aware that, should he choose not to abide by the terms of the juvenile
sentence, an adult sentence will be imposed upon him."' Finally, the fact that
jurisdiction over the offender is "extended" past the age at which a juvenile
would normally be ineligible for adjudication in the juvenile court, provides
an increased opportunity to rehabilitate the receptive child." EJJP, and hybrid
transfer provisions in general, are sensible alternatives to simply trying more
kids as adults.8 EJJP works well for young, first-time offenders, like the
thirteen-year-old in G. 0., as well as for habitual offenders who need a realistic
alternative to traditional adult transfer.
Ill. THE CASE OF IN R G.O.89

G.O. was a thirteen-year-old boy living in the City of Chicago, who
had never been arrested before, but had the misfortune of being in the wrong
place at the wrong time.' His friend shot and killed a person in a park, and
he was ultimately charged by the State with first degree murder and

85. See Lisa M. Wortman, Does Transfer to Adult Court Work? Recidivism and
Juveniles Tried as Adults, JUV. JUST. CoMm. NEWSL, Sept. 1995, at 3 (reporting that the rate
ofrecidivism forjuveniles who were prosecuted as adults was significantly higher than for those
kids who were adjudicated in the juvenile system); Violent Youth, supra note 82, at 1041
(arguing that EJJP gives older juvenile offenders one last chance at utilizing the rehabilitative
services unique to the juvenile sentence, such as psychological and educational counseling and
job training programs).
86. In Illinois, when it appears that the child has violated the conditions of the juvenile
sentence, the juvenile court may issue a warrant for the arrest of the minor, and after a hearing,
order execution of the previously imposed adult criminal sentence. 705 IlL. COMP. STAT. 405/5810(6). Once the revocation of the stay of the adult criminal sentence has been completed, the
juvenile court jurisdiction shall then be terminated. Id.
87. See PATRICIA TORBET & LINDA SZYMANSKI, STATE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO
VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME: 1996-97 UPDATE 6-7 (1998) (explaining that extended jurisdiction
allows the juvenile court to commit ajuvenile to the juvenile corrections department for a longer
period of time than the court's original jurisdiction, typically age twenty-one) [hereinafter
UPDATE].
88. See STATE RESPONSES, supra note 75, at 15-16 (explaining that the notion of
extending the age of the juvenile court's continuing jurisdiction reflects concerns that placing
juveniles in adult facilities is dangerous and ineffective, and that EJJP encourages juveniles to
use juvenile justice resources for development while making sure the juvenile is held
accountable for his actions); Part IV infra.
89. In reG.O., 710 N.E.2d 140(Ill. App. Ct. 1999), vacatedin part and revd in part
727 N.E.2d 1003 (111. 2000).
90. G.O.,710N.E.2dat 145.
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aggravated discharge of a firearm on an accountability theory. 9' He was
arrested and interrogated by the police for approximately three hours before
finally relating a story of gang violence where he was used as bait to lure a
rival gang member into a deadly trap.' G.O.'s attorney asked for a jury trial,
but this request was denied by the juvenile court.93 The trial court found G.O.
delinquent for first degree murder and committed him to the Illinois
Department of Corrections. 9' At the time G.O. was being tried, only habitual
and violent juvenile offenders were allowed a jury trial, based on the
reasoning that they were facing a determinant sentence." G.O. contended that
he was denied equal protection of the law by being treated dissimilarly
although he was similarly situated to violent and habitual juvenile offenders
since he faced incarceration until age twenty-one. The appellate court agreed.
The court held that a thirteen-year-old who had never been arrested before was
similarly situated with violent and repeat juvenile offenders, and it concluded
that there was no rational basis for denying G.O. a jury trial." The refusal to
grant G.O.'s demand for a jury trial was held to violate the Equal Protection
Clause of both the United States and Illinois Constitutions.' The court
emphasized, however, that its holding was limited to juvenile offenders under
fifteen, since those charged with first degree murder over fifteen are subject
to automatic transfer.9"
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 143.
Id. at 147.
Id. at 143.
Id.

95. G.O.'s attorney filed a formal jury demand on January 6, 1998, before the passage
of the Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1998. Thus, only a violent juvenile offender having been
previously adjudicated a delinquent minor for what would have been at least a class 2 felony,
and a habitual juvenile offender, one who had been twice adjudicated a delinquent minor were
allowed a jury trial. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-815, 5-820 (1998).
96. G.O., 710 N.E.2d at 146. The Court noted that juveniles are not a suspect class, so
there is no heightened scrutiny of the statute, and it will therefore invalidate the law only if it
is arbitrary or bears no reasonable relationship to a legitimate state goal. Id. at 145; see People
v. P.H., 582 N.E.2d 700 (IIl. 1991) (holding that rational basis review is used to examine a
statute for equal protection violations where no suspect class is implicated). The United States
Supreme Court has determined that, generally, only classification schemes affecting race, ethnicity, nationality, or gender (to a lesser extent) deserve heightened scrutiny where the law must
be found to serve either an important or compelling state interest. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190 (1976); Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
97. G.O., 710 N.E.2d at 147; see ILL CONST. of 1970, art. 1,§ 2; U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1. The court examined the legislative history of the violent and repeat juvenile offender
provisions and determined that the sentencing was the same as that for first-time juvenile murder
defendants because the legislative goal was to punish the offender in all three cases. G.O., 710
N.E.2d at 146.

98. Id. at 147; see 705 ILL COMP. STAT. 405/5-130(l)(a) (stating that minors at least
fifteen years of age charged with first degree murder are statutorily excluded from the juvenile
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The Illinois Supreme Court granted the State's petition for leave to
appeal the appellate court's ruling, and a decision was handed down in March
of 2000." In the period between the appellate court ruling and the supreme
court ruling, however, the Illinois Supreme Court had ruled that the act which
mandated imprisonment for juveniles adjudged delinquent for first degree
murder was unconstitutional." ° The court held that, due to the Cervantes
decision, G.O. was no longer subject to mandatory sentencing, so he is no
longer similarly situated to violent and habitual juvenile offenders.'
Furthermore, the supreme court held that because G.O. was no longer subject
to the mandatory minimum sentence, G.O.'s argument, that the process to°2
which he was subjected was more punitive than rehabilitative, failed.'
Because the law underlying the appellate court'sjudgment was rendered void,
the supreme court vacated the judgment that G.O. was denied equal protection
under the law.0 3 The court did not address the question of whether it should
reconsider Fucini,'" and whether juveniles should in fact be given a jury trial
right. 0 5 Furthermore, the court did not consider whether the reenacted version

court). It must be noted that, although G.O. raised adue process challenge to the denial of ajury
trial, the court was compelled to follow McKeiver, 403 U.S. 528, and In re Fucini,255 N.E.2d
380, which held that ajuvenile was not entitled to ajury trial as a matter of due process. G.O.,
710 N.E.2d at 144-45.
99. In re G.O., 727 N.E.2d 1003 (ill. 2000). The court's holding on the issue of the
voluntariness of a confession, that the respondent must have made the statement freely, without
compulsion or inducement, will not be discussed in this comment. See id at 1012.
100. People v. Cervantes, 723 N.E.2d 265,274 (111. 1999). The court invalidated Public
Act 88-680 on the basis of the single subject clause of the Illinois Constitution of 1970. Id. The
court held that the act amended fifty-five different Illinois statutes purportedly relating to
"neighborhood safety," but invalidated the entire act since some of the provisions had no
relation to neighborhood safety. Id. at 270. Thus, 705 ILL COMP. STAT. 405/5-33(1.5) (1996)
was nullified as unconstitutional. However, the General Assembly has since reenacted the law
providing for imprisonment of the minor adjudged delinquent for first degree murder until his
or her twenty-first birthday, without the possibility of parole for five years. 705 ILL COMP.
STAT. ANN. 405/5-750(2) (West 1999).
101. G.O., 727 N.E.2dat 1007.
102. Id The court simply concluded that Cervantesinvalidated the mandatory minimum
sentencing provision that G.O. was sentenced under, so he was no longer similarly situated with
violent and habitual juvenile offenders. Id.
103. Id.
104. 255 N.E.2d 380, 382 (Ill. 1970). Fucini is the Illinois equivalent to the McKeiver
decision, making the same argument that a jury trial would destroy the rehabilitative nature of
the juvenile court proceeding through adversary competition. For the facts of Fucini,see supra
note 55.
105. G.O., 727 N.E.2d at 1007. The majority states that the argument considered by
Justice Heiple, whether ajury trial should be granted to juveniles charged with murder, was not
before the court and therefore expressed no opinion as to the merits of that argument. Id. at 1007
n.3; see infra notes 114-117 and accompanying text.
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of the sentencing provision for juveniles charged with first degree murder"°
entitles juveniles to a jury trial because G.O. cited to no authority that would
permit the court to render an advisory opinion. 07
In Justice Heiple's dissent in G.0., he differed with the majority's
holding and stated that any proceeding where a defendant could be sentenced
to multiple years in incarceration were criminal and therefore entitled such a
defendant to all the procedural protections afforded to criminal defendants,
regardless of whether it is a juvenile proceeding.'
Disagreeing with the
majority's conclusion that Cervantes resolved G.O.' s constitutional challenge
to the denial of his request for ajury trial, Justice Heiple concluded that, even
if G.O. was not subject to the mandatory minimum sentence, he was entitled
to a jury trial." Heiple asserted that the basic charge of delinquency is the
commission of a criminal offense, and if found guilty, a juvenile can be
incarcerated in the Department of Corrections."' This is a "classic case of
crime and punishment," he concluded."' Stating that punishment and public
safety are now the juvenile justice system's overriding concerns, Heiple
declared that it was time to reconsider the premise of McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania."2 Although Heiple maintained that rehabilitation remains an
important aspect of the juvenile justice system, the same is true of the adult

106. 705 ILL CoMP. STAT. 405/5-750(2).
107. G.O., 727 N.E.2d at 1008. The court cited Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7) and
People v. Franklin, 656 N.E.2d 750 (1995) for the proposition that G.O.'s argument about the
reenacted statute was waived because G.O. failed to cite authority.
108. G.O., 727 N.E.2d at 1014 (Heiple, J., dissenting). Although Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145 (1968) held that there is a category of "petty" offenses which are not subject to
the Sixth Amendment jury trial provisions, The Supreme Court held in Baldwin v. New York,
399 U.S. 66 (1970), that no offense can be deemed "petty" for purposes of the jury trial right
where imprisonment for more than six months is authorized.
109. G.O., 727 N.E.2d at 1015; see ILL CONST. of 1970, art. I, § 8 (granting accused
persons in criminal prosecutions the right to a speedy public trial by an impartia jury); Duncan,
391 U.S. at 149 (holding that trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American
scheme ofjustice, and that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right to a jury trial in all
criminal cases which, were they to be tried in federal court, would come within the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee).
110. G.O., 727 N.E.2d at 1015 (Heiple, J., dissenting).
11. Id.
112. Id. at 1016; see 705 ILL COMP. STAT.405/5-101 (1998) (stating that it is the intent
of the General Assembly to promote a juvenile justice system that will protect the community,
impose accountability for violations of the law, and teach the juvenile about the seriousness of
abiding by the law). McKeiver focused on the rehabilitative nature of the juvenile proceeding
in denying a jury trial right to juveniles, assuming the adversarial system would defeat the
rehabilitative nature. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
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criminal justice system, so that fact should not be the sole basis of denying
rights to juveniles."I
To support his position, Justice Heiple asserted that, in addition to the
fundamental shift in purpose from the original juvenile court to the modem
juvenile justice system, the trend has been to add virtually all of the
constitutional requirements of the adversarial criminal court to juvenile
delinquency proceedings." 4 Furthermore, he contended thatFucinidoes not
foreclose G.O.'s argument because it interpreted the jury trial provision under
the 1870, rather than the 1970 Constitution."' The jury trial provision in the
1970 Constitution, unlike the one from 1870, does not require that the right
exist at common law prior to 1870 to be recognized." 6 Thus, given these
considerations, Heiple concluded that it was a denial of equal justice to
disallow G.O., and all juveniles facing similar incarceration, the right to a jury
trial when adults and other juveniles are afforded such a right."7
IV. ANALYSIS
A. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF IN RE G. 0.

The factual scenario in G.O. reveals what is wrong with the juvenile
justice system today."' We need to utilize a system that can effectively
113. Justice Heiple cited the Illinois Constitution, which stated that "[aill penalties shall
be determined both according 'to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of
restoring the offender to useful citizenship." G.O., 727 N.E.2d at 1016 n.8 (Heiple, J.,
dissenting) (quoting ILL CONST. of 1970, art. I, § 11).
114. G.O., 727 N.E.2d at 1016 (Heiple, J., dissenting); see cases cited, supra notes 4653, and accompanying text; Violent Youth, supra note 82, at 1101-03 (arguing that the McKeiver
decision was incorrect because it ignored the fact that procedural safeguards prevent
governmental oppression, and that juvenile court judges are more likely to convict than a jury
of detached citizens, based on statistical data comparing similar cases in juvenile and adult
court).
115. G.O., 727 N.E.2d at 1016 (Heiple, J., dissenting).
116. The 1870 Constitution stated that "[t]he right of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed,
shall remain inviolate," which required the right to exist at common law to be recognized by the
1870 Constitution. Id. at 1016 (quoting ILL CONST. of 1870, art. II, § 5). By contrast, the 1970
Constitution, as amended by the Eighth Amendment in 1994, specifically grants the right to a
jury in criminal cases. ILL CONST. of 1970, art. I, § 8. The jury trial provision in § 13, therefore,
has consequently been interpreted as applying solely to civil cases. G.O., 727 N.E.2d at 1017
n.9 (Heiple, J., dissenting).
117. G. 0., 727 N.E.2d at 1017 (Heiple, J., dissenting). Justice Heiple cites the provisions
allowing ajury trial for violent and habitual offenders as evidence that the incorporation of all
the procedural rights available to adults will not vitiate the justification for a separate adult and
juvenile justice system. Id.; see 705 ILL COMP.STAT. 405/5-815(d), 5-820(d) (1998).
118. Despite the fact that juvenile crime has actually been falling, the law has gotten
more punitive, and more and more kids are being either prosecuted as adults, imprisoned with
adults, or both. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME INTHE UNITED STATES: 1999
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punish and deter violent and habitual offenders without sweeping first-time
offenders like G.O. into incarceration unnecessarily. On one hand, society
would like to think the ideal of Jane Addams, that we can have a separate
system for juveniles focused on rehabilitation rather than retribution, is still
an attainable, practicable goal." 9 On the other hand, each time a school
shooting occurs, there is a public outcry to toughen laws in order to hold
juveniles accountable for their actions.'n Furthermore, there is a desire to
keep these particularly dangerous children away from the public at large."'
Most people would agree that a reversion to the common law system for
juveniles, where a minor could potentially be subjected to the death penalty
as an adult if he knew what he did was wrong, is too barbaric." However, it
is equally unrealistic to think that every juvenile delinquent is amenable to
treatment and therefore should never be transferred to adult court. 123 Thus, a
middle-road solution that can accommodate many juveniles, offering
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 11,211

(2000) (reporting that the violent crime rate fell 23% from

1995 to 1999 nationally, andthatjuvenile violent crime arrests decreased 8% from 1998 to 1999
while juvenile arrests overall from 1995 to 1999 fell by 9%nationally); Steve Chapman, Despite
What You Hear,The Kids are All Right, CtI. TRW., Dec. 21, 2000, § 1, at 27 (reporting that in

the last six years, the rate of homicide arrests in the ten-to-seventeen age group has dropped by
68%, reaching the lowest level since 1966, and that the juvenile arrest rate for murder, rape,

robbery and aggravated assault is down by 36%; yet Florida, which leads the country in trying
teens as adults, has a juvenile crime rate 48% higher than the national average); THREE STATES,
supra note 34, at 1I.
119. See, e.g., Donald P. O'Connell, Heading Off Juvenile Crime is the Key, CHI. DAILY
L. BUL, Apr. 24, 1999, at 4 (stressing the need to remember one of the fundamental concepts
espoused by Addams: that there must be a separate system based on children's potential for
positive change); see supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text; David Finney, Back to the Drawing
Boards,at http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DalyNews/gunshouse990618.html (March
7,2001) (reporting that public opinion polls show people want tougher gun control and juvenile
crime laws). See generally Julie Delcour, No Warning Label: The Dangers That Lurk Among
Us, TULSA WORLD, Aug. 27, 2000, § 1, at 1 (chronicling the public outrage over the strangulation of a seven-year-old girl, the rape of her twelve year old playmate and the desire to make
juveniles' criminal records public information in an effort to hold them accountable).
121. See, e.g., Crack Down, supra note 81, at 367 (arguing that popular efforts to "get
tough" on crime have resulted in longer criminal sentences, increased prison populations, and
disproportional incarceration of racial minority offenders); Anamaria Wilson, Lock 'Em Up!
Minority Youths Are More Likely to Face Trial as Adults, TIME, Feb. 14, 2000, at 68
(contending that minority youths arrested for crimes are twice as likely to be detained as their
white counterparts, and that there is a public sentiment that minority juvenile offenders should
be detained).
122. See supra notes 19-26 and accompanying text.
123. See STATE RESPONSES, supra note 75, at 11 (noting that sentencing reform across
the country came about because of public safety concerns about a subset of juvenile offenders,
those who commit violent offenses, and consequently focus has been shifted to offense-based
sentencing, rather than offender based).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

(Vol. 21

procedural protections, and an escape mechanism for truly resistant, violent
youths, is needed.12 4
B. THE NEED FOR A JURY TRIAL

Justice Heiple argued in G.O. that the time for disallowing a jury trial
right for juveniles has come to an end. 2 5 He was correct on this issue. For the
most of the twentieth-century, there has been a clear trend toward
criminalization of the juvenile system, and a shifting of purpose, from
rehabilitation to retribution and punishment. 126 Secondly, there has been a
fallacy since McKeiver that jury trials will effectively end the hope of
rehabilitation because they would entail delay, formality and the clamor of the

adversary system, which would erase the possibility of an intimate, informal,

protective proceeding.2 7 This is simply not true. The real threat to the
juvenile justice system arises from the possibility of incarceration with
adults, 12 not from merely granting procedural guarantees." 9 Indeed, the
problem with automatic transfer provisions, especially, is that they often lead

124. See id.at 11- 16 (describing the various versions of blended sentencing, where either
the juvenile court, or the adult court tries the case, but both have the option of imposing a
juvenile sentence or an adult sentence based on the offense and the characteristics of the
offender).
125. See supra notes 108-112 and accompanying text.
126. See Acknowledging the Shift, supra note 51, at 940 and accompanying text; 705 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 405/5-101 (1998) (stating that it is the intent of the Illinois General Assembly to
promote a juvenile justice system that will protect the community, impose accountability for
violations of the law); Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal
Responsibility and Sentencing Policy, 88 J.CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68,79 (1997) (arguing that
efforts to get tough as a result of the rise in youth homicide and gun violence in the late 1980s
signal a fundamental shift in purpose from treatment to punishment, from rehabilitation to
retribution, and from immature child to responsible criminal) [hereinafter Abolish the Juvenile
Court].
127. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 528-29; see supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
128. A Justice Policy Institute national survey found that, as aresult of automatic transfer
laws, which lead to adult criminal sentences, juveniles are eight times more likely to commit
suicide in adult jails, five times more likely to report being raped or attacked, twice as likely to
report being beaten by prison staff, and 50% more likely to be attacked with a weapon, at
http://www.cjcj.org/jpi/riskspr.html (last visited 3/14/01); see Barry C. Feld, Juvenile and
Criminal Justice Systems' Responses to Youth Violence, 24 CRIME & JUST. 189, 213 (1998)
(reporting that youths waived to criminal court often receive substantial sentences of
imprisonment, including life without parole or the death penalty and that waived violent youth
receive sentences four or five times longer than do their retained juvenile counterparts).
129. See Automatic Transfer, supra note 61 (arguing thatasaresult ofIllinois' increased
reliance on automatic transfer laws, including the passage of Senate Bill 759, which added
aggravated battery with a firearm to the list of automatic transfer crimes, increasing numbers of
kids are being exposed to the harsh and dangerous conditions of confinement in adult
institutions); Dennis the Menace, supra note 67, at 404-405.
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to incarceration with adults,"3 which is precisely what Jane Addams feared
the most, as she fought to create a better and more humane alterfative for
Illinois' troubled children."' Once outside of the juvenile facility, the child
loses access to rehabilitative services like educational help and social
counseling.' Allowing a jury trial for juveniles, however, would not affect
the access to these rehabilitative services. Indeed, the whole point of EJJP is
that juveniles can have a jury and still receive rehabilitative services.' 33
Various courts have recognized the unique danger of juvenile
incarceration in adult facilities. The Court in McKeiver, for example,
recognized the danger of treating children like adults, even though it denied
juveniles the right to a jury trial.' 3 Likewise, the court in Osorio v. Rios'
noted the inherent danger of crowding juveniles with adults in jails, especially
without affording those juveniles all the procedural protections afforded to
adults. " The Osorio Court noted that it was dealing with removal of the child
on a permanent or semi-permanent basis from the parens patriaejuvenile
world to the punishments of the adult criminal world.'37 It concluded that the
statute at issue violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution because it permitted a child to be punished indistinguishably
from an adult without the same procedural safeguards. 3

130. See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 63, at 208-09 (1999) (reporting that the
number of youths under eighteen in jails rose 35 percent from 1994 to 1997, that youths under
eighteen accounted for 2% of new court commitments to state adult prisons, and that there were
9100 jail inmates under age eighteen in 1997, over three-quarters of which were convicted or
awaiting trial as adult criminal offenders).
131. See supranotes 30-32,129 and accompanying text; Dennis the Menace,supranote
67, at 376 (explaining the principles espoused by the child-savers).
132. See Extended Jurisdiction,supra note 82, at 1369 (explaining that once a child
reaches maximum age, or is incarcerated in an adult facility, he loses access to rehabilitative
services from the state).
133. See STATE RESPONSES, supra note 75, at 16 (stating that blended sentencing is a
tool that can be used to encourage juveniles to use resources available to him or her).
134. 403 U.S. at 547. The Court explained that it was not mandating a jury trial for
juveniles because it was worried about placing the juvenile squarely in the routine of the
criminal process. Id. The Court assumed that adult procedures would necessarily require
abandonment of the juvenile court's rehabilitative goals. Id.
135. 429 F. Supp. 570 (D.P.R. 1976).
136. Id. at 572. The crowding situation in Osoriowas so bad that even juveniles who had
not been waived out of juvenile jurisdiction were being incarcerated with adults for lack of
facilities. Id. at 573. The Puerto Rican scenario here serves as an example of exactly what
should be avoided with respect to juvenile incarceration.
137. Id. at 575.
138. Id. at 576. The court noted that if a child is jailed like a common criminal, he or she
should have all the procedural protections of adults. Id.
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Similarly, the Minnesota Supreme Court in State v. Mitchell39 held that,
although a life sentence in prison for a fifteen-year-old convicted of first
degree murder does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment," the court
was nevertheless concerned about the implications of sending such offenders
to prison. The court suggested that, had EJJP been in effect when the offense
was committed, this would have been an appropriate situation for such a
sentencing option.' 4' Although the defendant in Mitchell was two years older
than G.O., and was the actual shooter, both cases illustrate scenarios in which
EJJP is beneficial.
In G.O., Justice Heiple stated that the majority was incorrect in
dismissing G.O.'s claim for a right to a jury trial merely because the
mandatory minimum sentencing provision 42 was held unconstitutional as a
violation of the single-subject rule.' 43 There are several reasons why Heiple
was correct. First, the Illinois Constitution specifically grants the right to a
Though juvenile proceedings are not
jury in criminal prosecutions."
specifically criminal, they are certainly quasi-criminal, given the stated intent
of the General Assembly to protect the community and impose accountability

on the juveniles who break the law. 45 A minor as young as thirteen may be
committed to the Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division, if he is found
guilty of an offense that would result in incarceration for an adult."

139. 577 N.W.2d 481 (Minn. 1998). In Mitchell, a fifteen year old participated in a
convenience store robbery during which he shot and killed the nineteen-year-old clerk. Id. at
483. The trial court sentenced him to the mandatory adult sentence, life imprisonment with no
possibility of parole for a minimum of thirty years. Id. The defendant then challenged the
sentence, saying it constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Id.
140. Id at 490.
141. Id. at 489. The court noted that the murder here occurred before EJJP had been put
into effect in Minnesota, but said it was a valid alternative for children who had committed
serious crimes, or were chronic or repeat offenders. Id. The court suggested that the trial court
should have utilized EJJP, had it been an option, when it considered certification of Mitchell
as an adult. Id.
142. Implicit in Heiple's reasoning is that mandatory minimum sentencing for juveniles
renders the entire system criminal in nature, so that juveniles subject to these sentences, even
without transfer to criminal court, need procedural protection. See generally Heidi Treiber,
Juvenile Justice: Rehabilitating the System after the Introduction of Mandatory Minimum
Sentences, 3 SUFFOLK J.TRIAL & APP. ADvOC. 175, 189-90 (1998) (arguing that mandatory
minimum sentencing should not be implemented in the juvenile system because children need
individualized adjudication that takes their age and experience into account, and therefore
mandatory minimum sentencing thwarts the goal of rehabilitation).
143. G.O., 727 N.E.2d at 1015 (Heiple, J., dissenting).
144. ILL CONST. of 1970, art. I, § 8; G.O., 727 N.E.2d at 1015 (Heiple, J., dissenting).
145. 705 ILL COMP. STAT. 405/5-101(1) (1998); see sources cited supra note 112.
146. 705 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-710(l)(b) (West 1999 & Supp. 2000). The
statute states that a minor found to be guilty may be committed to the Department of
Corrections, Juvenile Division, under section 5-750 if the minor is thirteen years of age or older.
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Furthermore, one of the stated goals of the Juvenile Justice Reform Provisions
of 1998 was to "provide due process" for juveniles charged with crime. 47
Although McKeiver does not require states to grant a jury trial right to
juveniles, it does allow states to decide to grant that right, if they so choose.'"
Moreover, some scholars have acknowledged that the time for overturning
McKeiver has come." 9
Aside from the fact that the United States Supreme Court has already
granted nearly every procedural right to juveniles, except the jury trial,'50 the
Illinois General Assembly has granted the right to a trial by jury in an
increasing number of instances already.' 5 ' Indeed, the appellate court in G.O.
specifically found that, to grant a jury trial for repeat and violent juvenile
offenders, but not for first-time offenders, who are not subject to the automatic
transfer provision,1 was a denial of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause. 53 Considering that the Illinois General Assembly has
reenacted the provision mandating incarceration for thirteen-year-olds
adjudged delinquent for first degree murder, it is a denial of equal protection
provided that the commitment to the Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division, shall be
made only if a term of incarceration is permitted by law for adults found guilty of the offense
for which the minor was adjudicated delinquent. Id.
147.

705 ILL COMP. STAT. 405/5-101(1)(d) (1998).

148. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 547. The court noted, "we are reluctant to disallow the
States to experiment further and to seek in new and different ways the elusive answers to the
problems of the young, and we feel that we would be impeding that experimentation by
imposing the jury trial." Id.
149. Seee.g., Violent Youth, supra note 82, at 1101-1103; Sara E. Kropf, Note,
OverturningMcKeiver v. Pennsylvania:The Unconstitutionalityof Using PriorConvictionsto
Enhance Adult Sentences Under the Sentencing Guidelines, 87 GEO. L.J. 2149 (1999)
(advocating a jury trial right for juveniles charged with non-petty offenses). See generally
STATE RESPONSES, supra note 75 at 17-24 (reporting which states grant a jury trial right to
juveniles).
150. See cases cited supranotes 46-54; G.O., 727 N.E.2d at 1016 (Heiple, J., dissenting).
151. There is a jury trial right for violent and habitual juvenile offenders, as Justice
Heiple pointed out, and there is also ajury trial right for those juveniles fortunate enough to be
tried using EJJP. See 705 ILL CoMP. STAT. 405/5-810(3), 5-815(d), 5-820(d) (1998).
152. Fifteen-year-olds charged with first degree murder, sexual assault or aggravated
battery with a firearm near a school, as well as thirteen-year-olds charged with first degree
murder during the course of rape or kidnaping (except for juveniles guilty only by
accountability) are all automatically transferred to criminal court, and could face adult
incarceration. 705 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-130(l)(a), (4)(a) (West Supp. 2000).
153. G.O., 710 N.E.2d at 727. Although the Illinois Supreme court held that Cervantes
eliminated the similarity between G.O. (the first-time offender) and violent and habitual
offenders, G.O., 727 N.E.2d at 1007, it did not rule on the effect of the reenacted provision, 705
ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-750(2), which permits incarceration for thirteen-year-old first-time
offenders. The practical impact of the reenacted provision is that offenders like G.O. are still
being denied equal protection of the law if the prosecutor does not choose to file a petition
designating the case as an EJJP. 705 IL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-810 (1998).
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offenders facing similar
to allow a jury trial right for violent and habitual
54

penalties, but not for the first-time offender.
In the twenty-first century, there is no reasonable basis to withhold a jury
trial right from all juveniles.' The differences between thejuvenile court and
the criminal court have eroded to such an extent that it simply does not make
sense to disallow a jury trial right to juveniles facing similar sentences as
adults."'56 The United States Supreme Court in Duncan v. Louisianaheld more
than three decades ago that the right to a trial by jury was one of the most
fundamental checks on arbitrary law enforcement and oppressive government
known to the American system ofjustice. 117 The Supreme Court has also held
that "[c]onstitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only
1 8
when one attains the state-defined age of majority." " "Minors, as well as
5
adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights.""

There is no reason to declare that a jury trial is a fundamental check on

arbitrariness in law enforcement for adults, but not for juveniles. In fact, the
opposite is true. With the broad discretion juvenile judges have to incarcerate
delinquents for years without a formal trial, a jury is needed to ensure such
power will not be arbitrarily used.'6

154. All juveniles face incarceration up to age twenty-one, depending on the offense. 705
ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-710(1) (1998). Yet only juveniles deemed "violent" or "habitual," in
both cases having at least one prior offense, are allowed a jury trial. 705 ILL. COM. STAT.
40515-815, 820 (1998). The law is thus underinclusive, and even under rational basis review,
the burden is on the state to show a fair and substantial relation between the object of the
legislation and the difference in treatment, based on the actual wording of the statute and the
legislative record. See F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920).
155. See Abolish the Juvenile Court, supra note 126, at 87-88. (arguing that because
judges and juries apply Winship's reasonable doubt standard differently, it is easier to convict
youths in juvenile court than in criminal court); Korine L. Larsen, Comment, With Liberty and
Justice ForAll: Extending the Right to A Jury Trial To The Juvenile Courts, 20 WM. MrrCHELL
L. REV. 835 (1994) (arguing that juvenile courts mirror criminal proceedings to such an extent
that to deny a jury trial right to juveniles amounts to a denial of due process).
156. See Abolish the Juvenile Court, supra note 126, at 89 (recognizing that the very
existence of blended sentencing represents a significant procedural and substantive convergence
with an erosion of the differences between juvenile and criminal courts).
157. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156. Justice Douglas' dissent in McKeiver agreed, simply
concluding: "the guarantees of the Bill of Rights, made applicable to the States by the
Fourteenth Amendment, require a jury trial." McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 558 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); see supra note 56.
158. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
159. Id.
160. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 155-56. The Court explained that the framers of the
Constitution provided ajury in criminal cases as a safeguard against the "corrupt or overzealous
prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge." Id. These considerations are
no less important for minors facing incarceration than for adults.
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Furthermore, the original version of the Juvenile Court Act allowed a
jury trial, so the Illinois General Assembly could not have considered a jury
trial, in itself, enough to defeat the rehabilitative nature of the separate
system. 1 Considering the addition of the jury trial right to greater classes of
juveniles with the reform provisions of 1998, there is no legitimate purpose
furthered by classifying among juveniles for granting a jury trial. 62
Therefore, as Justice Heiple argued, In re Fucini, holding that juveniles are
not entitled to a jury trial, should be overruled and the jury trial right should
be extended to all juveniles as a matter of equal justice and fundamental
fairness. 63 Illinois should thus follow an increasing number of jurisdictions
that have already deemed the right to a jury trial, as a check on the power and
arbitrariness of the judge and the prosecutor, essential for juveniles as well as
adults.'"
C.

EXTENDED JURISDICTION JUVENILE PROSECUTION AS A MIDDLE-ROAD
SOLUTION

The practical significance of In re G.O. is that it exemplifies the kind of
juvenile that would potentially benefit from EJJP. 65 G.O. was a thirteen year
old first-time offender, found guilty of first degree murder on an
accountability theory." 6 G.O. was initially adjudicated delinquent and
committed to the Department of Corrections, without the possibility of parole,
until the age of twenty-one. 67 Had G.O. been tried using EJJP, he would have

161. Illinois Juvenile Court Act, Ch. 23 § 170, 1899 Ill. Laws 131 (repealed 1966)
(granting a right to ajury of six in delinquency proceedings); see supra text accompanying notes
35-37.
162. A jury trial has been extended to the FJJPs via the reform provisions of 1998, rather
than to violent and habitual offenders exclusively. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-810(3) (1998).
See generallyF.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920) (holding that, where no
suspect class is involved for purposes of equal protection, the classification must be reasonable,
not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation
to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced will be treated alike).
163. G.O., 727 N.E.2d at 1016-17 (Heiple, J., dissenting). In addition to the argument
that Fucini has no bearing on the argument for a jury trial right because it was decided before
the 1970 Constitution, supra text accompanying notes 93-94, the criminalization of the juvenile
system applies, as does the assertion that procedural protection will dot unduly impair the
juvenile court's distinctive values. See Larsen, supranote 155, and accompanying text.
164. See Larsen, supra note 155, at 856 n.189. (reporting that nearly one-third of the
states have granted jury trials, as of right, in juvenile proceedings). For updated information on
states granting jury trial rights, see National Center for Juvenile Justice Statistics, supra note 8.
165. Any minor thirteen or older, as GO. was, who has committed a felony, is potentially
eligible for EJJP.705 ILL. CowP. STAT. 405/5-810(1); see supra text accompanying notes 77-83.
166. G.O., 710 N.E.2d at 143.
167. Id.; see Treiber, supra note 142, at 190.
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been allowed to serve his time in a juvenile facility, and thus have access to
the full rehabilitative services available, while at the same time allowing for
imposition of an adult sentence if he chose not to take advantage of the
benefits of the juvenile facility." 8 There would have been no need to worry
about being denied equal protection as compared to similarly situated habitual
and violent juvenile offenders, because G.O. would have had ajury trial open
to the public under EJJP.'69 Consequently, EJJP would have been particularly
beneficial for G.O., as for many other violent and habitual juvenile offenders.
Although there has been a general decrease in all types of crime in
Illinois 7 ° as in other states, there is no question that the threat of serious crime
As the line between
by juveniles represents a clear and present danger.'
juvenile and criminal court continues to blur, Illinois needs to find a middleroad solution that ensures fair procedural protection forjuveniles charged with
serious crimes and the flexibility to tailor punishments to the offense while
considering the unique characteristics of the offender. The Illinois General
Assembly should more fully utilize EJJP to ensure that first-time offenders
like G.O. are not swept into the adult criminal courts without a second
thought.7 2 It must be realized that it is possible to maintain the functional
distinction between the juvenile and criminal systems and yet afford
youngsters a fair trial, without being subjected to the whims of the
prosecutor. 73 We should accept the reality that the two systems are
74
inextricably linked, and begin to fully employ the benefits of both systems. 1
As Professor Feld has observed, trying juveniles with adult procedural
safeguards in juvenile court preserves both access to juvenile treatment

text.

168.

See 705 ILL. CoMp. STAT. 40515-810(1998); supra notes 85-88 and accompanying

169.

705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-810(3); G.O., 727 N.E.2d at 1006; see supra notes 77-

79 and accompanying text.
See ILLINOIS STATE
170.

POLICE DIVISION OF CRIME STUDIES SECION: CRIME IN

IUINoIS 1998 10-11 (1999) (reporting that there has been a 16.7% decrease in violent crimes
reported from 1995 to 1998, a 17.8% drop in homicide reports from 1995 to 1998, and a 13.4%
drop in reports of aggravated assault from 1995 to 1998).
171. See news articles cited supra notes 1-5.
172. See Extended Jurisdiction,supranote 82, at 1384 (concluding that EJJP combines

the most effective elements ofjuvenile and adult systems to address increasingly complex youth
crime).
173. As Heiple maintained, Illinois should not treat the failure to provide a jury trial in
delinquency proceedings as a method of shielding the juvenile from the adult criminal justice
system. G.O., 727 N.E.2d at 1017 (Heiple, J., dissenting); see Larsen, supra note 155, at 874
and accompanying text.
174.. See ExtendedJurisdiction,supranote 82, at 1384 and text accompanying notes 77-
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resources and allows for imposition of stiffer penalties, if the juvenile fails to
respond to the rehabilitative system, or re-offends. 7 5
There are ways to improve the current Illinois version of EJJP, however.
First, the General Assembly should amend the automatic transfer provisions,
the use of which often results in children actually serving time in adult
prisons, 176 and extend the scope of EJJP even to those children currently
subject to automatic transfer provisions.' 77 The General Assembly should
make it clear that EJJP is potentially available, even for juveniles who have
committed automatic transfer offenses, should the circumstances of the case

warrant EJJP.17' There does not have to be an adult sentence merely because

ajuvenile has been transferred to adult court. 179 Secondly, the juvenile should
not be subjected to the sole discretion of the prosecutor, as is the case with the

175. See Violent Youth, supra note 82, at 1123.
176. See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 63, at 210 (reporting that there was a 29%
increase in the number of under-eighteen youth newly admitted to state adult prison systems in
Illinois between 1992 and 1996, while in Arkansas, a state that allows the criminal court judge
to impose either ajuvenile or a criminal sentence, the number of under-eighteen youth admitted

to adult prisons dropped 85% between 1992 and 1996); STATERESPONSES, supranote 75, at 1314; Dennis the Menace, supra note 67, at 404-405 and text accompanying note 60.
177. Although the wording of the EJJP statute allows any minor over thirteen charged
with a felony to be potentially eligible for EJJP, upon an evaluation by the judge, it conflicts
with the automatic transfer provision, which says that certain offenses "shall be prosecuted
under the criminal laws of this state." 705 IL COMP. STAT. 405/5-130(1)(a), 405/5-810(1)
(1998).
178. See Extended Jurisdiction, supra note 82, at 1380 (reporting that the proposed
version of EJJP, 111.S. 363, 90th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Ill. 1997-98), included extending
EJJP to children who would otherwise face automatic transfer). There is no clear wording of this
concept in the current statute, however.
179. Consider the case ofPeople v. Kolakowski, No. 1-97-4293,2001 WL 99453, at *1,
13 (Ill. App. Ct. Jan. 30, 2001), in which a thirteen -year-old girl, transferred to adult court for
murdering an eighty-nine-year-old man while sleeping in his home, was sentenced to forty years
in prison. Despite her tender age, the reviewing court relied on the fact that she and her
boyfriend killed the victim with a brick and a knife, and concluded that the discretionary transfer
and forty-year adult sentence was appropriate. fd. at *7, 13. EJJP was never suggested in this
case, even though the defendant had no previous history of criminal activity, and a psychiatrist
recommended residential treatment. Id. at *6, 7. Under the proposed change to EJJP suggested
in this article, the trial judge could have imposed the same adult sentence, but stayed, pending
the outcome of a juvenile sentence replete with rehabilitative treatment. Even a criminal court
judge should be able to sentence in this manner when necessary, without an EJJP motion from
the prosecutor. See STATE RESPONSES, supra note 75, at 13-14 (noting that Arkansas and
Missouri allow a criminal court judge to impose either a juvenile or criminal sentence); e.g.,
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.073 (West Supp. 2001). A blended sentence in this case would have
been inherently more just than merely locking up a thirteen-year-old first-time offender for forty
years.
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current EJJP provision."8 The judge should be able to determine if EJJP is
8
appropriate without a petition from the State's Attorney first being filed. '
There should be guidelines implemented so that the local application of EJIP
can be more uniform and less susceptible to the politics of individual State's
Attorneys' offices, such as those who want to appear particularly tough on2
possible.
juvenile crime by seeking transfer to criminal court whenever
Such a "checks and balances" system would certainly be more equitable than
simply allowing the prosecutor to choose whether or not to file a petition to

try the case using EJJP."3

One drawback to blended sentencing, as a whole, is that it can create
84
confusion as to which statute to actually apply to a particular case, and what

85
the juvenile's status is during case processing and subsequent placement.

While it is difficult to eliminate this confusion without eradicating the entire
juvenile justice system, allowing a criminal court to consider a juvenile
sentence in lieu of a strictly criminal sentence for juveniles who have been
transferred to criminal court, provides a flexibility that benefits juveniles

180. See Donna M. Bishop & Charles E. Frazier, Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal
Court: A Case Study and Analysis ofProsecutorial Waiver, 5 NOTREDAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y 281,301(1991) (arguing in favor ofjudicial waiver because young prosecutors are not
in as good a position to make competent decisions about transferring juveniles as are judges);

Dennis the Menace, supra note 67, at 396; see also Donald P. O'Connell, Heading Off Juvenile

Crime is Key, CHI. DAILY L. BULL, Apr. 24, 1999, at 4 (arguing that courts making decisions
about juvenile transfers should function as a part of the community rather than in isolation from
the community, and that more intense judicial administrative attention for juvenile proceedings

is needed).
181. 705 li. CoMP. STAT. 405/5-810(1); see also Governor Edgar's Amendatory Veto
Message to Ill. S. 363, reprinted in JOURNAL OF THE SENATE 1366-69, Apr. 28, 1998 (arguing

that the judge should be able to consider the rehabilitative potential of the minor in determining
whether transfer to adult court should be allowed); Janan Hanna, Mandatory Life Term for Teen
Rejected: Judge Turns Aside Law; High Court to Get Appeal, CHI. TRIB., June 22, 2000, § 1,
at 1 (recounting Professor Randolph Stone's statement that judges need more discretion in
Illinois at all levels of a case involving a juvenile murder accomplice).
182. See THREE STATES, supra note 34, at 44 (reporting that a study of EJJP in
Minnesota revealed significant differences in application of the statute based on habits in
particular counties, and that there was noticeable difference in use of the statute in rural verses
urban settings).
183. See generally Richard E. Redding, Juveniles Transferred to Criminal Court: Legal
Reform Proposals Based on Social Science Research, 1997 UTAH L. REv. 709,754 (arguing that

a convergence of juvenile and adult sentencing would reduce the dangers inherent in
discretionary transfer).
184.

See, e.g., Donna M. Bishop, Juvenile Offenders in the Adult Criminal Justice

System, 27 CRIME&JUST. 81, 125-26(2000) (arguing that blended sentencing creates confusion
as to what philosophy ofjustice, rehabilitation or retribution, is to be applied, and that criminal
court judges lack expertise with respect to juvenile offenders, so they should not have to worry
about imposing juvenile verses criminal sentences).
185. See STATE RESPONSES, supra note 75, at 15.
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amenable to treatment even if the prosecutor did not seek to designate the
proceeding as an EJJP.'g A rebuttable presumption that all juvenile cases
statutorily excluded from the juvenile court' 87 are also EJJPs would simplify
the situation, and give the trial judge flexibility in sentencing.' Considering

the increasing numbers of juveniles ending up in front of criminal court

judges, those judges should be informed as to the juvenile services and

sentences available, and use their discretion to avoid harsh adult sentences
whenever possible."89
Additionally, the Illinois General Assembly should amend, or repeal, the
current violent and habitual juvenile offender provisions so that EJJP is

presumptively, and more uniformly, applied to violent and habitual offenders,

as those terms are defined in the statute.190 Blended sentencing options like

EJJPwere designed to specifically target violent and habitual offenders,' 9' and

to have separate provisions for such offenders without mentioning EJJP as an
option for these juveniles creates confusion as to when EJJP should be
utilized. "9For EJJPto work effectively, such broad, uniform implementation
of the sentencing option is essential. 93 However, in light of one state supreme
court decision in which EJJP was held unconstitutional under the state

186. Mandatory minimum sentences conflict with the flexibility that EJJP provides. As
the case of Leon Miller, in Illinois, or Lionel Tate, in Florida, illustrates, judges would like to
have an alternative to adult sentencing after transfer, in the interest of fairness to the young
offender. See, e.g., Hanna,supra note 181 (reporting the story of aCook County criminal judge
who refused to impose a mandatory life.sentence on a fifteen-year-old who had been statutorily
excluded from the juvenile court as an accomplice in the shooting deaths of two people); Clary,
supra note 3.
187. See 705 ItL COMP. STAT. 405/5-130 (1998).
188. The factors in the EJJP statute could be reviewed to determine if the offender
nonetheless deserves one last chance at a juvenile sentence, rather than incarceration without
rehabilitative service availability. See 705 ILL. COMp. STAT. 405/5-810(1)(b). EJJPdesignation
depends on a consideration of the seriousness of the alleged offense, the minor's history of
delinquency, the age of the minor, the culpability of the minor in committing the offense,
whether it was an aggressive or premeditated offense, and whether the minor used or possessed
a deadly weapon when committing the alleged offense. Id.
189. See Bishop, supra note 184, at 125.
190. 705 IIL COMP. STAT. 405/5-815,820(1998).
191. See THREE STATES, supra note 34, at 27 (reporting that EJJP was introduced in
Minnesota specifically to target serious or repeat offenders to give them one last chance at
rehabilitation within the juvenile system).
192. Both the violent and habitual provisions say that "[n]othing in this [slection shall
preclude the State's Attorney from seeking to prosecute a [violent or habitual juvenile offender]
as an adult," but the possibility of EJJP for such offenders is not mentioned. 705 IL.COMP.
STAT. 405/5-815(a), 405/5-820(g) (1998).
193. See THREE STATES, supra note 34, at 36 (stressing the need for guidelines as to
when EJJP should be used to eliminate disparities in application among counties).
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constitution's Equal Protection Clause,'" the Illinois General Assembly
should recognize the potentiality of such challenges and amend the Illinois
version of EJJP so that juveniles receive credit for the amount of the juvenile
sentence served if the adult sentence is later imposed. 9 ' Such an amendment
will increase the fairness in the application of EJJP in Illinois and reduce
potential challenges to the statute's constitutionality.
Today, the only effective way to carry out the articulated goal of
protecting society, while also attempting to rehabilitate juveniles, is not to
worry about the effects of procedural rights, but to focus on the sentences
actually imposed on these children.'" At the same time, we must provide an
escape valve for the unamenable juveniles to be dealt with accordingly.'9
Contrary to what one might think, juvenile crime has been falling,'9 8 giving
credence to the possibility that rehabilitation is still viable for the majority of
our distraught, delinquent children. 1 On the other hand, some sources
indicate that arrest rates for violent juvenile offenders have actually increased

194. See In re S.L.M., 951 P.2d 1365, 1367 (Mont. 1997). The Montana Supreme Court
held that EJJP violated equal protection under the Montana Constitution in that all juveniles
subject to the provision were at risk for serving an adult sentence in addition to their juvenile
disposition, thus treating EJJP offenders more harshly than adults for the same offense. Id. at
1373, 1375. EIJP has since been reenacted, however, with the qualifying statement that "[t]he
combined period of time of a juvenile disposition under (1)(a)(i) plus an adult sentence under
subsection (1)(a)(ii) may not exceed the maximum period of imprisonment that could be
imposed on an adult convicted of the offense.., that brought the youth under the jurisdiction
of the youth court." MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1604(1)(b) (1999). The Illinois General
Assembly should adopt a comparable provision as a preventive measure in the event of a similar

equal protection challenge.
195. The current version of EJJP does not allow for credit for time served under the
juvenile sentence. 705 IL.COmp. STAT. 405/5-810(6). Thus, a juvenile could argue that the
statute violates equal protection in that a juvenile serving part of a juvenile sentence, before
having the adult sentence imposed actually serves a longer sentence than a similarly situated
adult charged with the same offence. See S.LM., 951 P.2d at 1373. Indeed, credit for time
served is provided for in some states with EJJP. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.073 (West
1996 & Supp. 2001); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 9-27-507 (Michie 1998 & Supp. 1999).
196. See Dennis the Menace, supra note 67, at 404-05 (arguing that juveniles in adult
prisons are more likely to be physically and sexually abused and they receive no educational or
social services).
197. See generally Susan A. Burns, Comment, Is Ohio Juvenile Justice Still Serving It's

Purpose?, 29 AKRON L. REV. 335, 370 (1996) (arguing that since the implementation of the
separate system for juveniles, there have been certain classes of juvenile offenders who are
simply beyond the help of juvenile justice laws, and that juvenile justice is alive and well since
a majority of juvenile offenders can be rehabilitated).

198. See statistics cited supra note 118.
199. Chapman, supra note 118, at 27.
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by a staggering proportion.' ° Innovative techniques, such as blended
sentencing, are necessary in order to effectively resolve this intricate dilemma.
Lastly, although money for providing rehabilitative facilities forjuveniles
is always a concern, it can be done with no less difficulty than creating
facilities for adults now."° There are many creative possibilities to handle this
problem, such as requiring parents of juvenile offenders to pay the state to
incarcerate their delinquent children, or even using tobacco settlement money
to fund facilities for juvenile offenders.'
CONCLUSION
There is no simple answer to the problem of effectively combating
juvenile crime in the twenty-first century. Indeed, the answer changes as
society changes, becoming more complex with the passage of time. It is just
as unrealistic to think that rehabilitation can be achieved for every juvenile
offender, as it is to think that locking kids up, just like adults, will solve the
problem of youth crime. We must strike a balance between protection form
arbitrary punishment of young, troubled citizens and protection of society
from truly dangerous threats by its youth, in order to find an effective middleroad solution to violent juvenile crime. As the scenario in In re G.O.,
illustrates, we need to encourage rehabilitation for habitual offenders and
violent offenders alike, rather than simply transferring kids to adult court at
younger and younger ages.
While there is no single correct answer to solving juvenile crime, Illinois
should recognize that the time for worrying about the procedural distinctions
between juvenile and adult court has passed, and that there is actually a
200. EdwardE. Brown, PlaygroundorBattleground?The New ABCs, SOC. STUD., Sept.
1,2000,availableat 2000 WL 13145494 (reporting that between 1984 and 1994, the arrest rate
ofviolent juvenile offenders increased by 75%, though the teenage population, overall, did not
significantly increase). But see statistics cited supra note 118 (reporting that there was an
increase in arrests between the 1980s and 1990s, but that rates dropped from 1995 to 1999).
201. See, e.g., John L. Petterson & John Dvorak, Prisons Accord Appears Likely,
LegislatureWorks to Reduce Crowding, KAN. CITY STAR, Apr. 26,2000, at BI (reporting that
the legislature planned to use twenty-nine million dollars in tobacco settlement money to fund
new incarceration facilities for both juveniles and adults).
202. See id.; Jennifer Sullivan & Timothy O'Hara, Parents to Pay a Bigger Chunk of
Juvenile IncarcerationCosts, SARASOTA HERoLD-TRIB., July 1,2000, at BMI (highlighting the
law requiring parents of Florida's juvenile offenders to pay twenty dollars per day for each child
staying in a detention facility, where the judge ultimately decides if parents should pay). But see
Tom Ridge, Editorial, If They Build It...How a New Juvenile Prison Could Create Its Own
Clientele, Prr. POST-GAZETtE, at A16 (arguing that the new Pennsylvania facility for juvenile
offenders with adult sentences, built after enactment of harsher transfer provisions, will ensure
that adult crimes equal adult time and will not solve the delinquency problem).
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continuum of adolescent behavior that defies labeling and requires graduated
penalties to effectively handle as many factual scenarios as possible. 3
Illinois should more fully exercise new methods of juvenile justice reform,
such as EJJP,' to give the juvenile offender every possible chance to help
himself or herself, while also providing an escape mechanism for those violent
children apparently out of the system's reach. In this way, those violent, often
older and repeat juvenile delinquents, may be held accountable for their
actions as any serious criminal offender.
EJJP is certainly one sensible middle-road solution for violent children
that balances accountability and rehabilitation. EJJPcan effectively address
the needs of both the violent, perhaps first-time, juvenile offender, as well as
the habitual juvenile offender. Therefore, the current Illinois violent and
habitual juvenile provisions should be repealed, in order to more efficiently
utilize EJJP, and resolve confusion as to whether EJJP, rather than the violent
or habitual offender statute, should be applied. 2 5 Judges should have more
freedom to utilize these blended sentences, even for those children who have
been transferred to criminal court, should the totality of the circumstances
warrant such utilization.' Likewise, prosecutors need to have more specific
guidelines for when to use EJJP, and judges or defense attorneys should be
able to designate a case as an EJJP so that its use will not depend purely on
the prosecutor's discretion.2 Judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys must
therefore work with each other, as well as the community, to ensure the
fairest, and most effective, justice system possible for our children.
CHRISTIAN SULLIVAN

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

See Abolish the Juvenile Court, supra note 126, at 89.
See supra notes 77-88 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 190-192 and accompanying text.
See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
See supra note 180 and accompanying text.

